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This paper develops a theoretical search framework to analyse the
wage losses experienced by displaced workers. We underline the im-
portance of accounting for two dierent sources of wage losses whose
consequences might dier, namely the loss of rents earned on their
predisplacement job and the loss of accumulated rm-specic human
capital.
We then turn to the measurement and decomposition of wage losses
in France and the US using micro data from labor force surveys. We
show that while the order of magnitude of wage losses ar comparable in
the two economies (10 to 15%), the sources of wage adjustment dier
strongly: all of the wage decline in France seems to be due to the loss
of accumulated rm specic earning potential, while in the US case,
they only account for half of the total wage adjustment.
 I thank Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Cohen, Hank Farber, Alan Krueger, Gilles Saint-
Paul, as well as labor seminar participants at Princeton University for useful comments
and remarks.
11 Introduction
In recent years, various studies (mostly based on US data) have documented
the labor market eect of exogenous shocks leading to involuntary job losses.
Their main conclusion is that workers aected by these shocks experience
limited spells of unemployment but undergo important and long-lasting wage
losses (see Farber[8] and Ruhm [19]; also see Fallick[7] for a survey).
The interest of such studies is manyfold. First, they underline the in-
dividual welfare costs of labor reallocation (see Howland and Peterson[11]),
hence making the case for structural retraining policy intervention. Second,
from a more theoretical point of view, these studies suggest that these wage
adjustments might play a key role in driving the labor market back to equi-
librium after a reallocative shock. As a consequence, it has been assumed
that such studies might also shed light on the working of labor markets.
For instance, two comparative studies of wage losses of displaced workers
(see Leonard and Van Audenrode[17] and Cohen et al.[6])argue that the ob-
served wage losses pprovide information on unemployed workers reservation
wage strategies and might provide insights on the cause of high european
unemployment duration. Studying wage adjustments in Belgium, Leonard
and Van Audenrode[17] nd that displaced Belgian workers experience long
spells of unemployment but no wage losses and show that this could be as-
cribed to the high level of the minimum wage. Cohen et al.[6] study wage
adjustments on the French and US labor markets. Contrary to Leonard and
Van Audenrode, they nd no evidence of higher wage "rigidity" in France,
and conclude that the length of French unemployment is most likely to be
due to other sources of (non-wage) rigidities (e.g. ring costs).
While the descriptive study of wage eects of job displacement is inter-
esting in its own right, the analysis undertaken in the last two papers is
far from being completely satisfactory as no attempt is made neither to ex-
plicitly formalize the relationship between unemployment duration and the
extent of wage losses, nor to clarify the economic mechanisms that underlie
these wage losses. As shown in various studies of job displacement in the US,
wage losses may stem from two main sources. The rst one relates to the
accumulation of rm-specic (not transferable to other jobs) human capital.
A negative relationship between wage losses and seniority on the job lost is
often seen as evidence of this eect (see ...). The observed downward wage
adjustment might also result from the loss of job-specic rents that were
2captured on the previous job. For instance, Carrington[5], Carrington and
Zaman[?] and Krashinsky[12]show that wage losses are correlated to rm
size, unionization rate, industry and other job characteristics that explained
non-competitive aspects of wages dierentials1. Furthermore, this latter in-
terpretation is also consistent with the aforementioned nding of a negative
relationship between wage losses and seniority on the job lost: As pointed
out by the debate on returns to seniority2, a positive relationship between
wages and tenure might arise from the fact that workers tend to stay longer
in "better" jobs (dened as paying higher wages).
In this paper, we argue that assessing the relative importance of these two
eects is a crucial step in the understanding of the relationship between wage
losses and unemployment duration in cross-country comparisons. As the job-
search literature underlines, the key determinant of individual duration of
unemployment, besides the arrival rate of job oers, is the willingness3 of
workers to accept low-paid jobs, compared to their market productivity. If
wages losses of displaced workers mainly reect the adjustment of wages from
the ex ante rm-specic productivity to the lower post-displacement market
productivity then they convey little information about the reservation wage
strategy of diplaced workers and should be poorly correlated to the length
of unemployment. On the contrary, if the extent of wage losses reects the
reservation wage strategy of unemployed workers, a cross-country compari-
son of unemployment-induced wage adjustments might provide hints on the
causes of high unemployment duration in Europe.
These ideas are illustrated in the framework of an equilibrium search
model. We develop a search model with on-the-job search and accumulation
of rm-specic human capital and study the relationship between unemploy-
ment duration and wage losses of displaced workers (where these losses result
both from a fall in productivity and a loss of search-rents). We show that
the reservation wage strategy of unemployed workers is only unambiguously
correlated to the loss of job-search rents, while the loss of rm-specic hu-
man capital convey little information on the unemployed workers reservation
wage strategy.
1See Krueger and Summers[13] for a study of inter-industry wage dierentials using
job displacement as a natural *experiment to assess the existence of industry rents as a
component of earned wages.
2See Topel[21] for a presentation.
3This paper is about the rigidity of re-entry wage levels. This rigidity can arise from
either high unconstrained reservation wages or from high and *binding minimum wages.
In the latter case*, the rigidity lies in the ability to accept low wages rather than in * the
willingness to do so but this distinction is not tackled here.
3This theoretical distinction is then applied to a comparison of the eect
of job displacement in France and the US. We rst estimate total wage losses
of displaced workers. Then we try to decompose these wage losses into two
components: losses of rents and losses of rm-specic human capital, by
using consistently estimated returns to job seniority.
2 A theoretical model of unemployment induced
wage losses
The objective of this section is to develop a theoretical model of wage losses
of displaced worker. This model is then used to provide a welfare interpre-
tation of displacement induces wage losses and to illustrate the interplay
between unemployment duration and wage losses of displaced workers. The
general framework used here is a job-search model. Yet, the typical job-
search model does not yield any wage losses for displaced workers, since
workers losing their jobs will re-enter the labor market at wage levels drawn
from a wage distribution similar to that of incumbent employed workers.
In the model we develop, wage losses stem from two key ingredients: the
possibility of on-the-job search and on-the-job training. We then study the
equilibrium relationship between each of these sources of wage losses and
the duration of unemployment.
We consider a discrete-time search model where workers can be either
employed or unemployed. For simplicity's sake, job termination is modelled
as a deterministic event and we assume that employment spells only last
two periods. We allow for on-the-job search. This enables workers to change
job at the end of their rst period of employment without going through
unemployment. Nevertheless, job-to-job movers do not push up their em-
ployment horizon by changing jobs4. We also allow for job-specic human
capital accumulation that brings productivity growth at a rate g5, so that
if the rst period wage is given by w, the second period wage will be equal
to w(1 + g)6.
4This strong assumption implies that job switching decision is only governed by wage
considerations, as it is the case in an innite horizon model with Poisson separations.
5The process of human capital accumulation should actually ben made endogeneous.
This would only reinforce the results found below as workers would invest less on low-wage
jobs then on high wage jobs.
6The process of human capital accumulation should actually ben made endogeneous.
This would only reinforce the results found below as workers would invest less on low-wage
jobs then on high wage jobs.
4The job oer arrival process is assumed to be a Markov process and
we call  (resp. 0) the probability that an unemployed worker (resp. an
employed worker) receives a job oer. We further assume that wage oers
can only take on two values w and w (w < w) and let p denote the probability
that the oered wage be equal to the higher value.
2.1 Search Strategies
The present discounted value of employed workers's (expected) future in-
comes is non-stationary, since the remaining duration of employment varies
between period one and two. As far as the unemployed workers' search
strategies are concerned, the rst period value of employment is the only
value function that should matter. These value functions are the following:
High wage workers
Obviously, workers who initially draw the high-level entry wage will never
switch job in the course of their employment spell. Hence, the value of being
employed at w is equal to :





(1 + r)2Vu (1)
where r denotes the interest rate and Vu the value of unemployment.
Low wage workers
The intertemporal value of entering a low-wage job depends on the wage
level w and on the prospects of future wage rise. In the case of low wage jobs,
wage increases can be achieved through either job switching or accumulation
of job-specic human capital. We assume that g is small enough so that
switching to a high-wage job at the beginning of period 2 is strictly preferred
to the alternative of staying on the low-wage job for a second period. The
value of being employed at w is then :






(w   w(1 + g)) +
1
(1 + r)2Vu (2)
where the second term on the right-hand side corresponds to the expected
payo from on-the-job search.
Unemployed workers
When receiving a wage oer, an unemployed worker can always turn
it down and keep searching. As in any search model, the key issue is to
5determine the range of acceptable oers. The unemployed worker's criterion
in determining this optimal range of acceptable oers is to maximize his
expected wealth.7
In this simplied model, the search strategy amounts to three possibili-
ties: I- accept all oers, II- accept high wage oers only, III- never accept
any oer. We rule out this last possibility, assuming for instance that unem-
ployment benets denoted by b are lower than w. The choice between the
rst two strategies depends on the sign of V I
u   V II
u , where V i
u stands for
the intertemporal value of unemployment when choosing strategy i.
We now explicit these value functions.
First strategy: accept high wage oers only:
In this case, the value of unemployment is given by:
V I














Note that R(:) is an increasing function of its argument.
Second strategy: accept all oers:
The value of unemployment under the secund strategy is given by:
V II




















The sign V I
u  V II
u depends on the entire set of parameters (b;w;w;p;r;g;;0).
The eect of most of these parameters have been studied in the search lit-
erature and will not be mentioned here (see Mortensen[18] for a survey). In
this section, we focus on the eect of specic human capital accumulation
and on-the-job search.
7One can further note that since the rst-period value of employment is an increasing
function of the wage received, this model clearly exhibits the reservation wage property, ie.
if it is optimal for the worker to accept a given level of oered wage then all jobs oering
a higher wage should be accepted.
6Job mobility
It is clear that on-the-job search will only aect the value of low-wage
jobs, since high wage workers will never nd it protable to change job.
This can be easily seen by comparing equations 1 and 2. On-the-job search
actually increases the value of low-wage jobs. Hence it makes it more likely
that these will be accepted. This is a standard result when on-the-job search
is allowed for (see for instance Burdett and Mortensen [4]).
On the job wage growth
As is obvious from equations 3 and 4, g aects dierently the value of
















(1 + r)2[pw + (1   p)w   0pw]
The eect of on-the-job wage growth on the decision to accept an oer
depends on the comparison of these two eects. It can be analyzed as follows:
(i) Without on the job search, an increase in g creates more incentives to
accept low-wage oers. This is due to the following mechanism: On-the-job
wage growth proportionately increases the value of low- and high wage jobs,
but leaves the value of unemployment benets unaected. Compared to
strategy II, strategy I trades a higher expected duration of search against
a higher expected capital gain when exiting unemployment (Ve(w)   Vu).
Indierence between strategies I and II, is reached when the value of taking
low-wage jobs is equal to unemployment compensation plus the expected
gain from continued search. A rise in g increases the value of low-wage jobs
and the expected capital gain from continued search in the same proportion.
But since it leaves the value of unemployment benets unaected, the overall
eect of g is to stimulate the acceptance of low-wage jobs.
One should still note that this eect is likely to be weak in cross-country
comparison, due to the fact that when unemployment benets are indexed
on previous wages, a rise in g also induces a rise in b.
(ii) With on-the-job search, the eect of on-the-job wage growth might
be dierent. In that case, part of the intertemporal value of low-wage job
has to do with the possibility of job switching, a component that is not
aected by the rate of on-the-job wage growth. Consequently to a rise in g,
the value of low wage jobs might then rise by less than the value of high wage
7jobs. Hence it might be the case that an rise in g hinders the acceptance of
low-wage jobs8. Several factors are likely to reinforce this eect, for instance
the fact that unemployment benets might increase with the g, or the fact
that g might be lower for low-wage jobs.
2.3 Welfare analysis
In our model, two wage distributions can be observed depending on the equi-
librium search strategy. The search strategy also determines the magnitude
of wage losses experienced by displaced workers. Equilibrium distribution of
wages and wage losses of unemployed re-entrants are given in the following
table, where  denotes the relative wage losses of re-entering unemployed
workers.
Under Strategy I: Under Strategy II:
- the density of observed wages is - the density of observed wages is
w with proba 1=2
w(1 + g) with proba 1=2
w with proba 1=4
w(1 + g) with proba 1=4(1   0p)
w with proba 1=4(1 + 0p)
w(1 + g) with proba 1=4
- the observed wage losses are - the observed wage losses are
I = g=2 II = g=2 + 0p[1=2   gw=2(w + w)]
Under strategy I, the losses are simply the result of rm-specic capital
accumulation while under strategy II wage losses stenm from two dierent
sources: loss of rents and loss of human capital.
It can be argued that the welfare interpretation of these wage losses dier
depending on the driving source of wage adjustments. Loss of accumulated
rm-specic earnings potential come from the interplay of the job destruc-
tion and specic capital accumulation processes. Increase in that type of
wage losses due to a change in either of these two processes translates (for
any worker) into a decrease in the mean expected value of wages earned
troughout the entire career and a rise in the variance of these wages. Hence
8The condition for this to happen is that : 
0p(1   p)w > (1   p)w + (1  
R()
R(p))pw






ie. if unemployed workers prefer to turn down low-wage oers in the case with no
unemployment benets and no possibilities of wage growth.
8that type of wage losses can unambiguously be considered as harmful for
aggregate welfare. This is not necessarily the case for teh second type of
wage adjustments: a rise in 0 rises average wage losses of displaced workers
but also increases the expected value of wages of unemployed workers and
diminishes the ex-ante future wage inequality among them. Hence to the ex-
tent that the driving mechanism is mostly a reshuing of workers amongst
jobs with dierents rents that compensate for initial out-of-unemployment
inequalities in wages, wage losses can be the apparently harmful consequence
of a desirable outcome. This should be kept in mind when analyzing and
comparing wage losses of displaced workers.
2.4 Wage losses and unemployment duration
We proceed now to study the equilibrium relationship between unemploy-
ment duration and the wage losses of workers experiencing unemployment
spells. Search models show that the length of unemployment depends on a)
the job oer arrival rate, b) the reservation wage which determines the oer
acceptance rate. A crucial issue in the understanding of high unemployment
duration is to determine whether it is due to wage or non-wage rigidities or,
more precisely, to a low oer arrival rate or to a low oer acceptance rate.
The question we raise here is whether it is possible to identify the sources
of higher unemployment duration (acceptance or arrival) by looking at the
relative wages of re-entering unemployed workers.
In our model, the equilibrium distribution of wages and the wage losses
of displaced workers depend on the equilibrium search strategy. As workers
increase their reservation wage, the range of accepted wage oers shrinks to
the upper part of the oered wage distribution. Consequently, 1) the average
duration of unemployment increases (from 1= to 1=p), 2) the range of
protable job-to-job switches declines, as does the overall wage dispersion
and lastly, 3) the relative wage losses of the average unemployed worker will
also fall as the distribution of re-entry wages comes closer to the overall wage
distribution.
Nevertheless, one should note that the level of the reservation wage only
aects the extent of the loss of on-the-job search rents: Losses of rm-specic
human capital will not fall when the reservation wage rises and might even
increase. Hence the observed wage losses of displaced workers is ambiguously
correlated to the reservation wage strategy of unemployed workers. Still, if
it is possible to control for the accumulation of job-specic human capital,
the residual wage losses can provide clues about the sources of high duration
unemployment. This is due to the fact that as the reservation wage increases,
9the scope for on-the-job search gains tends to shrink, as does the scope for
search-rents losses. Formally, we can dene a relative re-entry wage 
0, net
of the eect of g. Under strategy I we get 
0 = 0, under strategy II we get

0 = 0p[1=2   gw=2(w + w)]. This relative wage is positively correlated
to the reservation wage and could give clues as to the reason behind the
dierences in the duration of unemployment9. Note nally that the latter
statement is only true as long as the arrival rate of job oers on the job is
hold constant.
The rest of the paper estimates the extent of wage losses in France and
the US and tries to identify these dierent eects.
3 Econometric Model and Data
3.1 Econometric Model
3.1.1 Basic Equations
In order to identify the eect of job displacement on reemployment earn-
ings, it is common to estimate an extended Mincer-type earnings function,
including as independent variables the individual characteristics of the work-
ers (sex, education and total labor market experience), the characteristics of
the job lost (essentially tenure on the job lost) and a dummy variable (equal
to one if displacement occurred) that captures the eect of job displacement.
Formally, we have:
ln(wi;j(t)) = Xi1 + 2Tenurei;j(t 1) + Di + ui;j(t) (5)
where index i represents the worker, index t denotes time and index j(t)
represents the job held at time t; wi;j denotes the wage of individual i on
job j; Xi includes individual education, labor market experience and its
square; Tenurei;j(t 1) denotes individual tenure on the job held at time
t 1; Di is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i has been displaced
between t   1 and t.
As is clear from equation 5, the implicit approach is to compare post-
displacement wages of displaced workers to those of ex-ante (i.e. before
displacement) identical but non-displaced workers. The sub-sample of non-
displaced workers is then treated as a control group to predict the would-be
wages of displaced workers had the job loss shock not happened.
9Yet 
0 also depends on other parameters of the model. This makes estimates of 
0
harder to interpret. Still if we expect the high duration economy to have a higher and
a lower , a value of 
0 no smaller than in the low duration economy would constitute
evidence against the low acceptance explanation.
10The validity of this procedure relies on the assumption that the included
independent variables control for all the individual heterogeneity that could
be correlated with the displacement variable. The fact that job displacement
comes for exogenous reasons makes this assumption reasonable. When den-
ing the scope of the Displaced Worker Supplement, the CPS excludes indi-
viduals who have been "red for poor work performance, disciplinary prob-
lems or any other problem that is specic to that individual alone". Still, if
there exists some unobserved permanent individual heterogeneity correlated
to the displacement dummy, then ordinary least squares estimates of equa-
tion 5, will be biased. This will happen if, for instance, the less able workers
are more likely to be displaced, as suggested in Gibbons and Katz[9].
More formally, if the error term ui;j(t) can be decomposed into a perma-
nent individual i component and a stochastic term "i;j(t), then one needs
to implement an estimation procedure that accounts for these individual
xed eects. We do so by estimating equation 5 in rst-dierences. More
precisely, we implement the following model:
ln(wi;j(t)) = Xi1 + 2Tenurei;j(t 1) + Di + "i;t (6)
Other sources of bias might arise from the fact that part of the sample of
displaced workers will not be reemployed at the ending period of our survey.
If wage losses are correlated to the probability of reemployment, then we
are in presence of a standard sample selectivity bias. This issue is tackled
using the Heckman two-step correction procedure as will be explained later.
Lastly we explore the relationship between unemployment duration and the
magnitude of post-unemployment wage losses by adding dierent functions
of unemployment duration to the regressors of equation 6. The estimated
function becomes
ln(wi;j(t)) = Xi1 + 2Tenurei;j(t 1) + f(Duri)0 + "i;t (7)
where Duri stands for the duration of unemployment between pre- and post-
displacement jobs for individual i. We try dierent values of the f function
(squared, cubic and logarithmic).
3.1.2 Identication of the causes of wage losses
It might be worth noting that the above specications of the wage-loss equa-
tions are compatible with the various economic mechanisms that are likely to
account for these losses. The inclusion of the tenure-on-the-job-lost variable
in the set of independent variables is meant to allow for the fact that individ-
uals with higher pre-displacement tenure should also have (other things equal
11and apart from the displacement shock) higher post-displacement earnings.
Controlling for previous job tenure actually increases the measured wage
losses of displaced workers as these individual tend to have a fairly high
measured tenure on their pre-displacement jobs.
Yet this is still compatible with the two main opposing views on re-
turns to seniority. The rst is the standard human capital interpretation,
according to which workers tend to accumulate some job-specic human
capital. Under this interpretation, worker's wages are expected to fall after
job-displacement since part of their skills are not valued outside their pre-
displacement job. This rst view has been challenged by a search-oriented
interpretation (see for instance Jovanovic) according to which workers over
the course of their career tend to screen among heterogenous jobs and are
more likely to stay in the better ones. As the opportunities to locate the
best job oers increase with time spent on the labor market, then we should
observe a positive correlation between wages and both seniority and total
labor market experience. But this correlation should be seen as the result of
a time-consuming rent-seeking process rather than as a change in the indi-
vidual (or match) productivity. Furthermore, wage increases are supposed
to be gained through a process of direct (job-to-job) mobility between jobs.
On the contrary, when going through unemployment, workers re-enter the
labor market at the bottom of the wage ladder, i.e. in jobs whose aver-
age quality is lower than the one of jobs held by incumbent workers. This
mechanism explains why wages should fall after displacement.
Consequently the above specication leaves the question of the sources
of wage losses open. But, as noted in the rst part of this paper, it is crucial
to disentangle these two potential sources of unemployment-induced wage
losses if one wants to draw any conclusion from 22 cross-country compar-
isons of wage losses and unemployment duration. The empirical strategy
that we adopt here to tackle this problem is to use consistent estimates of
the returns to seniority to predict the productivity fall of displaced workers.
This enables us to compute the change in individual wages net of the fall in
productivity. This residual wage change variable is interpreted as the change
in search rents. By construction, this last variable should be zero on average
for job "stayers" but this might not be the case for job losers and especially
for displaced workers, as suggested above. We then reestimate equation 5
using this wage change net of productivity fall as a dependent variable to
assess the extent of rent losses following job displacement.
More formally, assume that wage determinants can be summarized by
12the following equation:
ln(wi;j;t) = X + F(Tenurei;j(t);t) + i + j(t) + "i;j(t);t
where F is a continuous function, i (resp. j) is an individual- (resp. job-)











The rst bracketed term on the RHS corresponds to changes in individual
productivity and the second term corresponds to what we called "loss of
rents".
To measure the extent of the loss of rents, we then implement the fol-
lowing equation:
ln(!i;j(t)) = Xi1 + Di + "i;t (8)
with ln(!i;j(t)) = ln(wi;j(t))   b F(Tenurei;j(t 1)), where b F is a consistent
estimate of returns to seniority.
3.2 Data
We use two dierent panel data sets, the French Panel of Employment sur-
veys (enqu^ etes Emploi) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The enqu^ ete Emploi is a labor force survey conducted by INSEE (the
French National Statistics Institute) over a representative sample of approx-
imately 60 000 French households. It is similar in many respects (focus, size,
sample structure) to the US Current Population Survey. But contrary to
the CPS, it has a lower frequency and is surveyed annually. The sample
has a rotating panel structure. Merging consecutive waves of the survey, it
is possible to follow individuals over three consecutive years. Furthermore,
individual labor market history is available through a retrospective report
of monthly labor force status.
We use the 1990 through 1997 waves of the survey which gives us 6
panel waves. The sample is restricted to prime-age (25 to 55 years old)
males. This restriction is justied by previous works (see Lefranc [15][14])
showing that within this segment the French and US labor markets exhibit
many similarities (notably in terms of unemployment rates) but also notable
dierences in the duration of unemployment. Imposing these restrictions,
we end up with a total of approximately 25 000 individuals.
13Compared to the enqu^ ete Emploi, the PSID has a smaller sample but a
longer panel structure. It was started in 1968, on the basis of 3 500 house-
holds and has been going on ever since. For reasons of comparability of
the dierent questions surveyed we restrict ourselves to the 1981 through
1992 surveys10. To get data similar to the French sample, we split the total
sample into subwaves of 3 consecutive years and pile up these subsamples.
Restricting the sample to prime age males, we get a sample of 14 000 indi-
viduals
Both data sets include detailed information on socio-demographic indi-
vidual characteristics. Information on job characteristics are also available
(industry, occupation, tenure, wages, hours of work). As already noted in
the literature (see Topel[21]), reported job tenure is particularly noisy in
the PSID. Declared tenure very often jumps inconsistently over a given job
spell. Some individuals suddenly report a rise in tenure of several years or
even a fall, while no job change is elsewhere reported. Since the tenure data
is of important matter to the analysis undertaken here, we smooth out in-
consistent reports of tenure using connected and consistently reported series
of seniority. French data are corrected in the same way.
In the attempt to replicate previous studies of the eect of job displace-
ment, it is crucial to clearly identify the reason for observed job losses.
Contrary to other data sets, the PSID and enquete Emploi only provide
incomplete information on the reasons of job ending.
Among others, the PSID distinguishes between workers who have been
either laid-o or red, and workers who lost their job due to the fact that
"their company folded, changed hands, moved out of town, their employer
died or went out of business". While the latter typically t the denition
of displaced workers, we should also probably include non-recalled laid-o
workers in our sample. A further argument in favor of that view is the small
number of individuals in the category of 'truly' displaced workers.
As for the French data, they draw a distinction between workers who
lost their job in a mass job-ending (more than 10 separations from a single
rm) and workers being individually separated from their rm. Again, this
doesn't coincide with the legal distinction between rings and layos and
there are good reasons to consider that part of the individuals classied in
the second group also t the denition of displaced workers.
In the rest of the paper, we present two series of estimates of the impact
10The nal release of the 1993 wave only occured recently and the subsequent waves
only gave place to a preliminary release. For these reasons, these waves were not included
in our sample.
14of job displacement. In the rst one, we distinguish between the two types
of job termination ("strong" and "weak" displacement). In the second one,
we pool the two reported reasons of job termination in a single group.
4 Basic results
4.1 Basic estimations
Table 1 and 2 present the basic estimates of the wage losses of displaced
workers. We study the change in both hourly and weekly wage, following
job displacement. Both variables are of potential interest but not for the
same reason. The hourly wage rate denes the unit price of labor and in-
uences the re-employment probability, since it is a crucial determinant of
labor demand. On the other hand, the change in weekly wages is a closer
approximation to the change in individual take-home pay and associated
welfare. All equations are estimated on the full sample of prime age males
and on three sub-samples dened in terms of educational attainment (the
education classication is given in appendix). The main reason behind this
decomposition is to check whether wage adjustments exhibit a particular
behavior for low-skilled individuals that are more likely to be bounded by
minimum wage regulations, especially in France.
The estimates found for the US labor market are close to those reported
in other studies, most notably the study of Ruhm[19] who uses data similar
to mine. They show that displaced US workers experience large wage losses
in an order of magnitude of 13 to 20% of their previous wage11. Wage
losses are also larger when wage are measured on a weekly basis. This is
consistent with the fact mentioned in Farber[8] that an important fraction
of previously full-time displaced workers return to a part-time job. With
respect to the identication of the causes of job ending, one can see that
estimated wage losses are larger for 'weakly' dened displaced workers, which
is consistent with the fact that this group includes individuals who lost
their job due to a dismissal. In that case, the wage earned on the previous
job might over-estimate these individuals unobserved quality. Furthermore,
these individuals might be stigmatized by the circumstances of their job
ending and be forced to accept lower wage losses to nd another job.
Estimated wage losses for France are lower than those found on US
data: they are on average equal to 10% of the previous wage, roughly two
11Since the independant variable is the change in log wages, the coecient on the
displacement dummy has the natural interpretation of relative fall in wages.
15thirds of the comparable US gure. Nonetheless, this gure represents a
non-negligible and (statistically) signicant part of previously earned wages.
Once again, we nd that wage losses are higher when measured on a monthly
basis and that 'weakly' displaced individuals (licenciements individuels) ex-
perience larger wage adjustments.
These overall dierences still hold when we split the total sample accord-
ing to the individual level of education. Measured wage losses are always
higher in the US than in France. One can also note that wage losses of
French displaced workers are an increasing function of the level of education
ranging from 7.7% of previous wages for low-skilled individuals to 17.4% for
high-skilled (or from 10.7 to 19.6% in terms of weekly wage). This does not
seem to be the case on the US labor market: if we look at the coecient on
D0, table 2 shows that wage losses are roughly constant across skill groups.
If we restrict ourselves to the coecient on D1 wage losses even appear to
be decreasing with skill in the US. These ndings are compatible with the
idea that the lower end of the French wage distribution is constrained by a
level of the minimum wage that would limit the scope for wage losses. Yet,
comparing hourly and weekly wage losses in the US, one can see that the
higher losses for low-skilled are due to a larger fall in hours per week, rather
than to a higher fall in the hourly wage rate. Looking at table 2-a, we see
that in France as in the US, low-skilled workers experience a lower fall in
hourly wage.
Comparing the wage adjustments of our two displaced groups, D1 and
D2, one can see that high skilled individuals who report having lost their job
due to a plant closing or "licenciement collectif" (D1) experience lower and
weakly signicant wage losses than other groups. On the contrary, other
involuntary job losses (PSID's laid o and red individuals and enqu^ ete
Emploi's "licenciement individuels") experience high and signicant wage
losses. Keeping in mind the results found in other studies of a higher wage
fall for high-killed displaced workers (see Carrington[5]), we see these sur-
prising estimates as a result of the fact that the D1 category fails to include
all high skilled displaced workers12. Furthermore, this bias might be more
pronounced for high skilled individuals.
4.2 Duration of unemployment and sample selectivity bias
Before proceeding to the explanation of the above mentioned wage adjust-
ments, one has to question the representativeness of the estimated coe-
12Note sur ambiguite de report
16cients. Since all of the displaced workers observed in our sample have not
returned to employment by the last observation of our panel, the sub-sample
of re-employed displaced worker might not be representative of the total dis-
placed population. Actually, this is most likely to happen if, as predicted by
search models, the probability of re-employment depends on the wage ad-
justment accepted by the job losers. In that case, as in our theoretical model,
there can be a negative relationship between the duration of unemployment
and the extent of wage losses, because of a productive search mechanism. If
so, the estimated wage losses of re-employed individuals might overestimate
the average losses of the representative displaced worker.
We rst estimate a generalized Tobit model, to account for this potential
sample selectivity bias. The estimated model is a two step Heckman model.
In the rst step, we estimate a reemployment probability equation using
a Probit model. This enables us to compute the Mills ratio associated to
each individual characteristics. This inverse of this ratio is then used as a
regressor in the estimation of wage change equation on the sub-sample of
reemployed displaced workers.
We do not estimate this equation on our US sample. Reasons for this
are threefold. First, while the sample selectivity bias might be an impor-
tant issue in our French data set, where roughly one half of the displaced
population did not return to employment by the period of our panel, it is
seems to be fairly less relevant to our US estimates where only one out of ten
displaced workers had not found a job by the same time. Furthermore, we
rely on previous US estimates showing a negative relationship between the
duration of unemployment and post displacement wages (see Addison and
Portugal[2]). Lastly, attempts to formally control for sample selectivity bias
have cast doubt on the relevance of this eect (see Swaim and Pogdursky[20]
and Houle and Van Audenrode[10]).
Estimates of the Heckman two-step reemployment equation are reported
in the appendix. The inverse of the Mills ratio is negative (as predicted by
the productive search model) but never close to signicance in the wage
change equation estimated on the sole sample of displaced and re-employed
workers. This nding is conrmed by the estimates of the wage losses equa-
tion where include the duration of unemployment instead of the displace-
ment dummy. These estimates indicate a negative and convex relationship.
Together these ndings seem to indicate that the estimated wage losses of
displaced workers in France do not overestimate the true wage adjustments
at work.
175 Returns to seniority and the wage losses of dis-
placed workers
We now try to identify the sources of wage adjustments, following the
methodology outlined in section 3. This identication procedure relies on the
availability of a consistent estimate of returns to seniority in both countries.
By consistent, we mean an estimate able to separate the true returns to se-
niority from the spurious correlation between wages and tenure attributable
to the screening behavior of the workers. There has been an important
debate surrounding this issue, where dierent methods and estimates have
been put forward by dierent authors13. Here we replicate Topel's 1991 esti-
mation procedure using US and French data. These estimates of the returns
to seniority are then used to decompose the wage losses estimated in the
previous section into two possible components, namely the loss of rents and
the loss of returns to seniority.
5.1 Returns to seniority
The basic idea Topel's two stage estimation procedure is the following. First
one must consider that true returns to seniority cannot be estimated using
OLS regression, since seniority on a job is endogeneous as soon as jobs dier
in their quality. Unfortunately,estimating a wage equation in rst dierence
does not allow to distinguish between returns to esniority and returns to
experience. The two-stage procedure amounts to rst estimate the joint
returns to experience and seniority in a rst stage and then to regress entry-
level wage on entry-level experience to obtain an upward biased estimate of
returns to experience. Substracting this estimate from the estimated joint
returns to experience and seniority yelds a downward biased estimate of
returns to tenure.
The results presented in table 4 estimate the returns to seniority using
Topel's two-stage. The replication of Topel[21]'s estimates yelds interesting
results. As is further documented in a companion note to this paper (see
Lefranc[16]) the estimate of returns to seniority based on the PSID are highly
dependent upon the choice of the wage variable used on the left end side.
In the latest waves of the PSID (from the end of the 70's on), two dierent
wage variables are available: one is the average hourly wage rate computed
from the total wage income earned on all jobs over the year preceding the
interview, the other is the (declared) current hourly wage rate on main job.
13See Abraham-Farber[1], Altonji-Shakotko[3] and Topel [21] for the main contributions
to this debate.
18Since the tenure variable used as the regressor refers to the current main
job, the second wage measure seems the natural one to use. unfortunately,
this variable is not available in the rst 9 waves of the panel.
Topel's results are based on the rst wage variable. Replicating his
study on a dierent time-period (81-92 vs. 68-83), we are able to closely
match his results based on the yearly average hourly wage (see table 4). Yet
estimating the same regression using the more appropriate wage variable
decreases signicantly the estimated results to seniority. Topel concludes
to a signicant impact of seniority on wages : according to his estimates
wages increase by 5.5% a year during the rst years on a job. Our preferred
estimate are signicantly smaller, showing that the early career returns to a
year of seniority are around 2%. This value is quite similar to what we nd
for France. These results are used in the remaining part of this paper.
5.2 Loss of rents or loss of human capital ?
Table 5 provides preliminary evidence on the relationship between seniority
on the job lost and wage losses of displaced workers. It shows that a higher
seniority is on average correlated to a higher wage loss. Nevertheless, this
correlation cannot be interpreted in a clear causal way. It might well be
the case that high-seniority workers forgo a greater amount of rm specic
human capital when being displaced. But it can also stem from the fact
that they were in a better paying-job to start with, which can explain both
why they stayed longer on that job and why they lose more by quitting this
job.Using estimated returns to seniority to estimate equation 8.
The results in table 6 show the extent of residual wage losses, once
the value of pre-displacement seniority have been substracted from the pre-
displacement wage.This table shows important diereces between the two
country. In France, most of the measured wage losses following displacement
are likely to be due to the loss of returns to seniority accumulated on the
previous job. Once we account for these forgone returns, the displacement
dummy variables appears to be non signicantly dierent from zero. This
is not true though for workers being on licenciement individuel (red) but
in this case, the neagative value of that coecient might stem from an het-
erogeneity bias. Contrary to what we nd for France, displaced workers on
the US labor market seem to experience wage losses beyond the mere loss
of rm specic earnings potential. As a matter of fact this loss of specic
capital accounts for not more than one-half of the total wage losses14.
14One might nevertheless question at that point the value of returns to esniority used
in this regression. Table 7 provides complementary evidence on the validity of our cho-
19Dierents factors seem to inuence these diverging results. First, while
the returns to seniority seem to be similar between the two countries, it
has to be noted that the average seniority of displaced workers is markedly
higher in France than in the US. This can explain why the loss of returns
to seniority is higher in France. To the extent that contrary to the US
case we do not observe any signicant loss of rents in France, our results
also seem to indicate that the dynamic of job changing also diers between
the two economies. As a whole, there seems to be less job changing in
France and smaller possibility to upgrade from the out of unemployment-
entry job to a better paying employment. These dierences maight stem
either from a lower arrival rate of job oers while employed or from a lower
dispersion of potential wages which makes job changing less likely for any
given level of (non-zero) productivity. Note nally that this is also consistent
with a higher reservation wage that diminishes the scope for further wage
improvements. Unfortunately these two dierent interpretation cannot be
disentangled without further evidence.
6 Conclusion
Comparing the extent of unemployment-induced wage losses in France and
in the US, this paper rst shows that French workers experience slightly
smaller wage decline than their US counterparts. The observed wage changes
are still signicant and of important magnitude. Furthermore, the results we
nd for France provide counter-evidence against the often mentioned wage
rigidity of European labor markets.
Turning to the question of the sources of these wage adjustment, we also
show that they stem from dierent sources in the two economies. French
workers mainly experience wage decline due to the loss of rm specic hu-
man capital, while displaced US workers have lower average seniority and
experience wage declines that seem to come evenly from a loss of human
capital and a loss of rents. One potential explanation of this dierence in
results could be that French workers encounter less opportunities to accumu-
late such rents over the course of their career. In the terns of the theoretical
model developed in section 2, this in turn might be due to a lower job oer
arrival rate while employed but is also consistent with a potentially higher
reservation wage that diminishes the scope for further wage improvements.
sen estimates: the residual wage losses computed from our estimated coecients of ther
returns to seniority doesn't not show any further correlation with seniority.
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22Table 1: Wage losses of Displaced workers
Dependent Variable Change in hourly wage rate Change in weekly wage rate
France United-States France United-States
Specication 1
D1 -0.087 -0.134 -0.112 -0.158
7.06 6.36 9.12 5.93
D2 -0.118 -0.156 -0.145 -0.201
6.26 11.3 7.79 11.51
Specication 1
D0 -0.096 -0.150 -0.122 -.188
9.29 12.82 11.89 12.77
Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are t statistics
23Table 2-a: Wage losses by level of education
Dependent Variable: Change in hourly wage rate
Level of education: High Medium Low
France US France US France US
Specication 1
D1 -0.075 -0.096 -0.108 -0.152 -0.065 -0.133
(1.78) (2.04) (6.99) (5.76) (2.80) (2.82)
D2 -0.29 -0.124 -0.088 -0.183 -0.124 -0.096
(6.35) (3.36) (3.68) (11.06) (2.72) (3.40)
Specication 1
D0 -0.174 -0.113 -0.102 -0.175 -0.077 -0.106
(5.60) (3.87) (7.84) (12.32) (3.70) (4.30)
Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are t statistics
24Table 2-b : Wage losses by level of education
Dependent Variable: Change in weekly wage rate
Level of education: High Medium Low
France US France US France US
Specication 1
D1 -0.093 -0.042 -0.140 -0.190 -0.101 -0.230
(2.43) (0.80) (8.55) (5.43) (2.79) (3.43)
D2 -0.317 -0.240 -0.102 -0.198 -0.127 -0.175
(7.66) (5.79) (4.04) (9.02) (2.79) (4.36)
Specication 1
D0 -0.196 -0.168 -0.129 -0.196 -0.107 -0.190
(6.96) (5.01) (9.34) (10.43) (5.16) (5.43)
Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are t statistics
25Table 4 : returns to seniority
26US (PSID) France (enquete Emploi)
dependant variable hourly wage hourly wage Topel hourly wage hourly wage
(yearly av.) (current) (inc. bonus) (; bonus)
OLS estimates
Experience 0.0451 0.03929 0.0403 0.040
(0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.0098)
Experience2/100 -0.1198 -0.0753 -0.1810 -0.1812
(0.0915) (0.0872) (0.0669) (0.0645)
Experience3/1000 -0.0008 -0.0136 0.0465 0.0465
(0.0286) (0.0272) (0.0180) (0.0174)
Experience4/10000 0.0022 0.0033 -0.005 -0.0050
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Tenure 0.0747 0.043 0.0131 0.0105
(0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0042) (0.0040)
Tenure2/100 -0.5672 -0.2983 -0.0636 -0.0515
(0.0827) (0.0792) (0.0431) (0.0416)
Tenure3/1000 0.2092 0.113 0.024 0.0216
(0.0354) (0.0337) (0.0166) (0.0160)
Tenure4/10000 -0.0261 -0.014 -0.0029 -0.0026
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0021) (0.0020)
First di. estimates
Experience+Tenure 0.1357 0.0464 0.1258 0.0553 0.0464
(0.0161) (0.0107) (0.0162) (0.0082) (0.0078)
Experience2/100 -0.3809 -0.1435 -0.4067 -0.1909 -0.1533
(0.1423) (0.0942) (0.1546) (0.0551) (0.0527)
Experience3/1000 0.07473 0.0280 0.0989 0.0303 0.0225
(0.0466) (0.0308) (0.0517) (0.0107) (0.0102)
Experience4/10000 -0.0058 -0.002 0.0089 -0.00018 -0.0001
(0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0058) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Tenure2/100 -0.5357 -0.1007 -0.4592 -0.038 0.0068
(0.0996) (0.0661) (0.108) (0.0376) (0.0360)
Tenure3/1000 0.2339 0.046465 0.1846 0.0063 -0.006
(0.0504) (0.0331) (0.0526) (0.0164) (0.0157)
Tenure4/10000 -0.0316 -0.007737 -0.0245 -0.0001 0.0012
(0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0079) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Two stage estimates
Initial experience 0.0805 0.029297 0.0713 0.0375 0.0357
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tenure 0.0551 0.017159 0.0545 0.0178 0.0106 27Notes: - all regressions include control for labor market experience, tenure on the job lost,
level of education, marital status, state of residence , union status and industry; Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors
28Table 5 : Wage losses and seniority



























Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
29Table 6: Residual Wage losses















Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
30Table 7: Residual wage losses and seniority
US (PSID) France (enquete Emploi)
Hourly wage rate
Plant closing -0.057241 0.00209
(0.02625773) (0.01770673)











Plant closing -0.09768 0.007509
(0.03297264) (0.01765556)










Notes: - D1 equals one for unemployment spells due to "displacement" (respectively "licen-
ciement collectif"); - D2 equals one for unemployment spells due to "lay-o or ring" (respectively
"licenciement individuel"); - D0 = D1 + D2; - all regressions include control for labor market ex-
perience, tenure on the job lost, level of education, marital status, state of residence and year
dummies; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
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